https://www.hk-lawyer.org/content/should-libel-remain-crime-hong-kong
In Hong Kong, libel is not just a tort (i.e., a civil wrong). It is also a crime. While England & Wales abolished its ancient defamatory libel offence on 12th January 2010 when Section 73 of the UK Coroners and Justice Act 2009 came into force, Hong Kong never abolished its own version of the same thing. Should libel remain a crime in Hong Kong?
Our modern law of defamation can trace its own roots back to 13th century England, when the ecclesiastical courts exercised criminal jurisdiction over all defamation matters. That well-documented fact was rightly described by Professor Richard Helmholz as “puzzling” – see Richard Helmholz, The Cannon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s, Chapter 11. By 1582 at the latest, the Star Chamber in England had also convicted a person of defamatory libel and sentenced him to “whipping and pillory” – see Sir John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (5th Edition), Chapter 25.
As of today, Section 5 of our own Defamation Ordinance (Cap 21) still reads as follows: –
“Any person who maliciously publishes any defamatory libel, knowing the same to be false, shall be liable to imprisonment for 2 years, and, in addition, to pay such fine as the court may award.”
Fortunately, neither whipping nor pillory would now be a lawful sentencing option for this statutory offence.
The last local reported judgment where libel featured as a crime instead of a tort should be the most interesting case of Chiu Chut-Fong v Law Chup [1973] HKLR 36, a judgment of McMullin J (as the late McMullin NPJ then was) dated 29th December 1972.
There, a local newspaper called Hong Kong Daily News published an article accusing a deceased person, Mr Lee Yau-Kong, of being a drug dealer who had also on one occasion plotted to murder some of his employees. Defamation against deceased persons being not actionable in tort, his widow, one Madam Chiu Chut-Fong, sought leave to start a criminal prosecution against that newspaper’s editor instead. Madam Chiu had the good fortune of being able to retain the services of Mr Robert Tang, then a junior counsel of around 3 years’ standing, at an oral hearing before McMullin J. The learned judge was persuaded to grant leave to Madam Chiu, and said this in his judgment (at 52 & 53): –
“It does not want great imagination to realise that, whatever the intention of the publication, its tendency must necessarily be to bring great shame on the family of the deceased. They are the kind of words which if not true cry out for refutation and amends yet no legal form of redress other than what she now seeks is open to the applicant. On the other hand, if she fails to prove the necessary intention or if the words are justified she will succeed only in widening and angering her wound. The risk is all hers, and I see no hardship or injustice in permitting her to seek a confrontation under law with her husband’s accusers. Speaking for myself I would think that the protection of private persons against any tyrannous abuse by press reporters of the wide latitude given under the law in printing matters of public interest is itself a matter of great public concern. For these reasons the applicant will have leave to proceed with the prosecution.”
What was more interesting, however, was the learned judge’s confirmation regarding the jurisprudential and/or social policy basis for making defamatory libel a crime (and not just a tort). According to McMullin J (at 48), whether the libel was against the living or the dead: –
“The ground of criminality in both cases is still the notion of a threat to public tranquillity and the basis of that is some affront so grave as to be capable of affecting the behaviour of living persons.”
In other words, by 1972, it was well-recognized in Hong Kong defamatory libel was made a crime because of the need to deter the malicious dissemination of fake news the contents of which were such an affront they could cause social disturbances and have an undesirable impact on the wider community. Maintaining public tranquillity would benefit society as a whole, so using the criminal law to deter dissemination was considered justifiable.
Bringing ourselves back to 2022, do we currently need to invoke the crime of defamatory libel, as set out in Section 5 of our Defamation Ordinance, more often than we used to, so as to stamp out the malicious dissemination of fake news via Twitter, WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, Instagram, LIHKG.com, discuss.com.hk, and such similar media or platforms? Or would invoking the crime of defamatory libel necessarily be such an unacceptable or at least disproportionate infringement of the freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 27 of the Basic Law the whole crime should be abolished in this jurisdiction, as had in fact been suggested by, amongst others, Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC in “Free Speech, Reputation and Media Intrusion: British Law Reform and Its Implications for Hong Kong and Beyond” (2012) 42 Hong Kong Law Journal 731?
A recent development in the UK can be our inspiration for the best way forward.
In July 2021, the UK Law Commission published a 239-page final report on “modernising communications offences” in which it recommended, amongst other things, the creation of a new statutory offence for sending or posting a communication known to be false. Whilst some commentators in the UK regarded this as a horrible attempt to resurrect those criminal libel offences which England & Wales abolished with great fanfare just some 11 years ago, Chris Philp MP, acting on behalf of the UK Government, had by a signed open letter dated 4th February 2022 confirmed the administration’s acceptance of the UK Law Commission’s proposal, and their commitment to create that new statutory offence “as soon as possible”, after which the malicious publication of false words could be made the subject of criminal prosecutions brought under new statutory provisions.
On 17th March 2022, the UK Government formally introduced its 225-page Online Safety Bill in Parliament, Clause 151 of which read as follows: –
“False communications offence
- A person commits an offence if –(a) the person sends a message (see section 153),(b) the message conveys information that the person knows to be false,(c) at the time of sending it, the person intended the message, or the information in it, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience, and(d) the person has no reasonable excuse for sending the message.
- For the purposes of this offence an individual is a “likely audience” of a message if, at the time the message is sent, it is reasonably foreseeable that the individual –(a) would encounter the message, or(b) in the online context, would encounter a subsequent message forwarding or sharing the content of the message.
- In a case where several or many individuals are a likely audience, it is not necessary for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) that the person intended to cause harm to any one of them in particular (or to all of them).”
It is interesting how this draft provision seems to be saying only harm caused to “a likely audience” should be relevant to criminality, and that reputational or monetary harm should be excluded altogether.
Of course, as the UK Online Safety Bill has only just been introduced in Parliament, further changes to its scope are possible, perhaps even likely.
Should Hong Kong do something similar, abolishing the ancient crime of defamatory libel, creating new statutory offences in its place, and modernizing the way we tackle the problem of fake news?
On 7th July 2021, at a video-recorded symposium co-organized by the reputable journalism schools of CUHK, HKBU & HKU, two panels of distinguished experts shared their views on this very topic – “Misinformation and Disinformation in Hong Kong: Is Legislation the Answer?”
Since the symposium lasted 3 hours, any attempt to summarize it in an article as short as this one is going to be wholly unfair to all speakers. I would, however, say that one of the panellists, Mr Ronny Tong SC, most sensibly reminded everyone of the actual words used in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which were as follows: –
“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”
Bearing in mind Hong Kong’s compliance with Article 19 of the ICCPR should be a matter of great importance, the learned panellist identified various practical difficulties in trying to deal with this thorny issue of fake news via new legislation, including the following: –
- Enforcement;
- Definition; and
- Boundaries.
For enforcement, the taxing issue was not just the volume of false information or the speed at which they travelled. The problem was fake news could originate from, or reach Hong Kong through, overseas corporations beyond the reach of the Hong Kong Courts.
For definition, the difficulties were obvious. The term “fake news” was itself difficult to define, and what was true could quickly become false. The learned panellist gave his own examples, but I would rather use the Santa Claus example. If you knew Santa Claus never existed, and the flying reindeer phenomenon depicted on Christmas Cards everywhere was just a dishonest fabrication, could you tell your own children otherwise? If some legends, myths, folklore and religious text should be exempted from the new law, how do you define those?
For boundaries, one must be careful not to create a piece of over-ambitious legislation, only to have it declared unconstitutional by the HKCFA upon closer examination. Needless to say, just as a person’s freedom of speech should never be without limit, a restriction on that freedom should never be too draconian.
Another panellist at the same symposium was Ms Rachel Blundy, then a Senior Fact-Check Editor for Asia Pacific at Agence France-Presse (“AFP”), physically based in Hong Kong.
The learned panellist was asked this question: –
“AFP already operates in many Asian countries where so-called ‘fake news laws’ or their equivalents have been implemented. Have you and your colleagues at AFP encountered any difficulties in going about fact-checking and other journalistic activities in those places because of those laws?”
Readers can easily find the learned panellist’s full and informative answer to this question by searching for the full video on HKU Journalism’s Official YouTube Channel. For the purposes of this article, the most important point she made was that AFP did not get into trouble in Singapore despite the implementation of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (“POFMA”) in that jurisdiction. She said she noticed there was indeed “less” misinformation around in Singapore for them to fact-check, compared to places like India, Hong Kong or Indonesia, but emphasized one should perhaps also ask “what else” had been screened out by POFMA.
Speaking of POFMA, I should perhaps add that at one of the symposium’s Q&A sessions, a question was raised by a part-time student joining the symposium by Zoom. The student mentioned Singapore had used POFMA to remove anti-vaccination Facebook posts which contained false information about Covid-19 vaccines, and that seemed to have helped raise the vaccination rate in that jurisdiction. Hong Kong did not seem to have done enough to deal with fake news vis-à-vis Covid-19 vaccines. The student then asked whether a Hong Kong version of POFMA would help Hong Kong deal with the Covid-19 pandemic.
In reply to that question, one of the panellists, Professor Cherian George, who was a native of Singapore, accurately reminded everyone Singapore was never a party to the ICCPR, so that transplanting Singaporean media laws to Hong Kong may not work.
I must say Thailand was a party to the ICCPR, but that never stopped Thailand from having some of the strictest media laws in the world. Indeed, Section 112 of the Criminal Code of Thailand currently says a person found guilty of defaming the Thai King can be sent to prison for 15 years for each act of defamation. In January 2021, Anchan Preelert, a Thai lady in her 60s, was convicted by a Thai Court of 29 counts of criminal defamation. The Court said each count should attract a 3-year custodial sentence, each of which should be served consecutively, making the starting point an 87 years’ imprisonment. Giving full credit to Anchan Preelert’s timely guilty plea, the ultimate sentence was reduced to 43 years’ imprisonment, meaning she would be just about over 100 years old at the end of it. BBC, CNN, the Financial Times, Reuters and RTHK reported it.
Similarly, the Russian Federation was also a party to the ICCPR. That fact did not stop the Russian Federation from enacting a “fake news law” on 4th March 2022, making the malicious defamation of the Russian Federation’s military forces a crime punishable by 15 years’ imprisonment.
Should we choose to keep our crime of defamatory libel, exactly as set out in Section 5 of our Defamation Ordinance, we can at the very least say the maximum sentence is not even half as long as the one set out in Section 112 of the Criminal Code of Thailand, or half as long as the one set out in the Russian Federation’s new “fake news law”, but I very much doubt whether journalists in Hong Kong would find that sufficiently reassuring.
With all of the above in mind, what do you all think Hong Kong should do? I shall leave that question open for all of you to consider.
Barrister, Jason Pow SC’s Chambers
Kenneth K Y Lam is a Barrister in private practice. Called to the Bar in 2004, he sat as a Deputy District Judge, and as a High Court Master. He is a Fellow of the Hong Kong Institute of Arbitrators, and a member of Jason Pow SC’s Chambers. He acted for the successful plaintiff in the Social Media Libel case of Chow Wing Kai v Liang Jing [2021] 2 HKLRD 1189. He is recognized as a Leading Junior of the Hong Kong Bar by Legal 500 (Asia Pacific, 2022).
在香港，永久形式誹謗是侵權行為（即民事過失），也是刑事罪行。雖然隨著英國《2009年死因裁判官和公義法案》第73條生效，英格蘭和威爾斯已於2010年1月12日廢除了古老的「永久形式誹謗罪」，香港從未廢除相同罪行。香港應否繼續把永久形式誹謗定為刑事罪行？
我們現今的誹謗法的根源可以追溯至13世紀的英格蘭。當時教會法庭對所有誹謗事項行使刑事管轄權。這段史實有詳細文獻紀錄。Richard Helmholz教授正確地把它描述為「令人費解」（參見Richard Helmholz《The Cannon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s》第11章）。至1582年，英格蘭星室法庭亦曾經判定一個人刑事誹謗罪罪成，並判處他「鞭刑及枷刑」（參見Sir John Baker《An Introduction to English Legal History (5th Edition)》第25章）。
時至今日，香港的《誹謗條例》（第21章）第5條仍規定如下：
「任何人惡意發布他明知屬虛假的誹謗名譽的永久形式誹謗，可處監禁2年以及被判繳付法院判處的罰款。」
可幸鞭刑及枷刑現在都不是這項成文法罪行的合法判刑選擇。
在香港有被報導的判決中，最後一宗把永久形式誹謗視為刑事罪行而非民事侵權行為的，應該是極為有趣的 Chiu Chut-Fong v Law Chup [1973] HKLR 36案，由麥慕年法官（後來出任終審法院非常任法官，已故）於1972年12月29日判決。
當時，《新報》發表了一篇文章，指控死者Lee Yau-Kong先生是毒販，並曾一度密謀謀殺他的一些僱員。由於對死者進行誹謗不能以民事侵權法律提出訴訟，其遺孀Chiu Chut-Fong申請法庭許可對該報的編輯提出刑事檢控。她有幸聘任到當時僅3年資歷的新晉大律師鄧國禎，出席麥慕年法官主持的口頭聆訊。學識淵博的麥慕年法官批准了她的許可申請，並在判詞中指出（第52和53頁）：
「不需巨大的想像力也意識到，無論報刊的目的為何，它必然會給死者家屬帶來巨大的恥辱。那些言詞假如並非屬實，必須予以反駁和修正，但除了申請人現在尋求的途徑以外，沒有任何合法的補救方式。另一方面，如果她未能證明必要的意圖，或那些言詞屬實，她只會令對自己的傷害更大。風險全在她身上，我認為允許她依法尋求與丈夫的指控者對質，沒有任何問題或不公正之處。對我而言，法律給予新聞記者很大自由度刊印涉及公眾利益的事項，而保障個人不受濫用這種自由的損害，本身就是公眾非常關注的問題。基於這些原因，申請人獲准進行起訴。」
然而，更有趣的是，這位學識淵博的法官確認了把永久形式誹謗定為犯罪（而不僅是侵權）的法理及／或社會政策基礎。根據麥慕年法官的判詞（第48頁），不論永久形式誹謗是針對生者還是死者：
「兩個情況均應視為刑事罪行的基礎，是它們均威脅公共安寧，而其依據均為某些冒犯言論的嚴重程度足以影響在世人士的行為。」
換言之，至1972年，香港已經有充足的認知，永久形式誹謗被制定為刑事罪行的原因，是香港有需要阻嚇假新聞的惡意散佈，因為冒犯言論可能引起社會騷亂，對社會大眾帶來不良影響。維護公眾安寧對整個社會都有好處，因此以刑事法阻嚇散播被認定為恰當。
回到2022年，我們現在是否需要比以往更頻繁地援引《誹謗條例》第5條下的永久形式誹謗罪，以杜絕大眾通過Twitter、WhatsApp、Telegram、Facebook、Instagram、LIHKG.com、discuss.com.hk等媒體或平台惡意傳播假新聞？還是，援引永久形式誹謗罪，對《基本法》第27條保障的言論自由來說，必然是不可接受或至少是不成比例的侵犯，正 Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC在《香港法律學刊》（2012年第42期第731頁） 「Free Speech, Reputation and Media Intrusion: British Law Reform and Its Implications for Hong Kong and Beyond」所指，該罪行應在本司法管轄區廢除？
英國最近的事態發展可以啟發我們尋找最佳前進方向。
2021年7月，英國法律委員會發表了一份長達239頁關於「把與通訊有關的刑事罪行現代化」的最後報告，建議就發送或張貼已知為虛假的信息，訂立新的罪行。雖然英國有評論認為這只是糟透地嘗試把英格蘭和威爾斯在約11年前高調地廢除的刑事誹謗罪起死回生，但代表英國政府的Chris Philp MP於2022年2月4日簽署了一封公開信，確認政府接受英國法律委員會的建議，並承諾會「盡快」制定新的法定罪行，務求令到惡意發佈虛假言論可在新的法例條文下被刑事起訴。
2022年3月17日，英國政府正式向議會提交了長達225頁的《網絡安全法案》，當中第151條內容如下：-
「虛假通訊罪
- 任何人在以下情況下即屬犯罪—(a) 該人士發送信息（見第153條），(b) 該信息傳達該名人士明知是虛假的資料，(c) 在發送該信息時，該名人士擬透過該信息或當中的資料，對可能受眾造成重大的心理或身體傷害，及(d) 該人士沒有合理的理由發送該信息。
- 就本罪行而言，若在發送信息時可以合理地預見以下情況，個人是信息的「可能受眾」。該個人：(a) 會接觸到該信息，或(b) 就網絡而言，會接觸後續的信息轉發或分享信息的內容。
- 在幾個或多個個人是「可能受眾」的情況下，就第(1)(c)條的目的而言，該人士無須打算對當中任何一個人（或對他們所有人）造成傷害。」
有趣的是，該草案條文似乎是說只有對「可能受眾」造成的傷害，才算犯罪，而名譽或金錢上的傷害，則應完全排除在外。
當然，由於英國《網絡安全法案》才剛剛提交予議會，故其範圍可能甚至多數會有所更改。
香港應否參考英國的做法，廢除古老的永久形式誹謗罪，訂立新的法定罪行取而代之，使處理假新聞的方式更現代化？
2021年7月7日，在中大、浸大及港大新聞學院合辦的視像專題研討會上，著名專家組成的兩個討論小組，曾經就「香港的錯誤信息和虛假信息：立法是否答案？」這個非常議題分享意見。
由於該研討會歷時3小時，嘗試以本文有限的篇幅作出總結，對所有講者都不公平。然而，我需要指出其中一位小組講者湯家驊資深大律師有明智地提醒大家，《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十九條的確實用詞如下：
「(一) 人人有保持意見不受干預之權利。
(二) 人人有發表自由之權利；此種權利包括以語言、文字或出版物、藝術或自己選擇之其他方式，不分國界，尋求、接受及傳播各種消息及思想之自由。
(三) 本條第(二)項所載權利之行使，附有特別責任及義務，故得予以某種限制，但此種限制以經法律規定，且為下列各項所必要者為限—
(甲) 尊重他人權利或名譽；或
(乙) 保障國家安全或公共秩序，或公共衞生或風化。」
考慮到香港遵守《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十九條十分重要，他指出通過立法處理棘手的假新聞問題的各種實際困難包括：
(1) 執法；
(2) 定義；及
(3) 界限。
在執法方面，問題不僅在於虛假信息的數量或傳播速度，而是假新聞可能源自或通過香港法院無法控制的海外公司傳播到香港。
在定義方面，困難是顯而易見的。「假新聞」一詞本身就很難定義，真實的東西可以很快變成虛假。湯家驊資深大律師舉了一些例子，但是我想引用聖誕老人的例子。如果你知道聖誕老人根本不存在，而隨處可見的聖誕卡上描繪的飛天馴鹿現象是不誠實地捏造的虛假陳述，你可以告訴孩子它們是真的嗎？如果某些傳奇故事、神話、民間傳說和宗教文本應不受新法律的約束，我們又該如何定義它們呢？
在界限方面，我們必須小心避免立法過於進取，導致終審法院在仔細審查後宣佈其違憲。毋庸置疑的是，正如言論自由永遠不應沒有限制，對言論自由的限制也不應過於嚴苛。
該研討會的另一位小組講者Rachel Blundy女士，當時是法新社亞太地區高級事實查核編輯，常駐香港。
她被問到這個問題：
「法新社已在許多實施了所謂『假新聞法』或類似法律的亞洲國家運作。你和法新社的同事有沒有因為這些法律而在這些地方進行事實查核和其他新聞活動時遇到任何困難？」
讀者可以在HKU Journalism的官方YouTube頻道搜索完整視頻，觀看她對這個問題的完整和詳細回應。她提出的最重要一點是，儘管新加坡在2019年訂立了《網路假資訊和網路操縱保護法》（POFMA），但法新社在新加坡並沒有遇到麻煩。她說，她注意到與印度、香港或印尼等地相比，新加坡需要她們進行事實查核的錯誤信息確實「較少」，但她強調，大家或許應該注意POFMA還過濾了「甚麼其他」資訊。
談到POFMA，我或許應該補充一點。在研討會的問答環節中，一位透過Zoom參加該研討會的兼讀學生提出了一條問題。該名學生提到，新加坡曾引用POFMA刪除了Facebook上反對接種疫苗的帖子，當中包含有關Covid-19疫苗的虛假信息，而這似乎有助提高當地的疫苗接種率。香港在處理與Covid-19疫苗相關的假新聞方面，似乎做得不夠。該學生隨後詢問香港版本的POFMA是否會有助香港應對Covid-19疫情。
新加坡土生土長的小組講者Cherian George教授在回答這條問題時準確地提醒大家，新加坡從來都不是《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》的締約國，因此把新加坡的媒體法移植至香港可能行不通。
我必須說，泰國是《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》的締約國，但這個事實並沒有阻止泰國擁有世界上最嚴格的媒體法。事實上，泰國刑法典第112條目前規定，誹謗泰王罪名成立者，每項誹謗行為可被判入獄15年。2021年1月，一名60多歲的泰國女士Anchan Preelert被泰國法院裁定29項刑事誹謗罪罪成。法院表示，每項罪名應被判處3年監禁，每項判刑分期執行，量刑起點為監禁87年。考慮到Anchan Preelert及時認罪，最終判決減至監禁43年，即她在刑期結束時已100多歲。英國廣播公司、美國有線電視新聞網、《英國金融時報》、路透社和香港電台均對此進行了報導。
俄羅斯聯邦同樣也是《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》的締約國，但這個事實並沒有阻止俄羅斯聯邦於2022年3月4日頒佈「假新聞法」，將惡意誹謗俄羅斯聯邦軍隊的行為定為犯罪，可處以15年監禁。
如果我們選擇保留《誹謗條例》第5條下的永久形式誹謗罪，我們最少可以說我們的最高刑期不及泰國刑法典第112條的最高刑期或俄羅斯聯邦「假新聞法」的最高刑期的一半，但我很懷疑身處香港的記者會否認為這樣已足夠令他們感到安心。
綜觀以上種種，大家覺得香港應該怎樣做？我把這個問題留給大家考慮。
鮑永年資深大律師辦事處大律師
林嘉仁是一名私人執業大律師。在 2004 年獲認許為大律師的他曾經擔任區域法院暫委法官及高等法院聆案官。他是香港仲裁師協會的資深會員，亦是鮑永年資深大律師辦事處的成員。他曾經在 周榮佳 訴 梁京 [2021] 2 HKLRD 1189 此一社交媒體誹謗案中代表勝訴的原告人。他被法律 500 強 ( 亞太地區 , 2022) 認許為一名香港領先大律師。
Hong Kong Defamation Law 